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Abstract 
ASEAN when defined as a single regional bloc, can be perceived as being one of the most 
prominent battle-fields between two new economic powerhouses; the US and China. When 
compared to efforts in the prior half-century, the US’s regional integration efforts were 
derided politically and economically since the 2007 Western financial crisis. This was 
predominantly due to a plethora of reasons alike to the fact that post the impasse, the ASEAN 
nations’ credence of the US as a political and trading partner greatly eroded. As a late runner, 
China exemplifies her regional prowess via an influx of Chinese emigration in those targeted 
regions. This enables the ASEAN nations to centre their trade around the Chinese economy in 
lieu of that of the US. This is galvanised by the wealth of the ethnic minority that efficiently 
entwine the ASEAN nations with China as the nucleus. Through the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, two 
subsequent agreements were penned; and these concepts are examined from the Chinese 
perspective, and the effects that are encompassed are further amplified throughout the course 
of this paper. 
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Agreement; Asian Regional Integration; US-China Regional Strategy 
 
1 Introduction 
The notion of economic regionalism retains an amalgamation of meanings in geography, 
sociology, demographics and diplomatic relationships. According to Hettne (2005), regions 
are socially constructed, politically contested units that depend on the perspectives of 
political actors to ‘exist’. This regional integration can be extended to the concept of different 
levels of interests, in relation to an individual country’s multifarious demands. 
Regardless of the elevated value of the Asian trading bloc, the focal point behind the 
construction of regional institutions have been disparate, as a result of conflicting economic 
objectives, and prior social struggles. Thus, various attempts in implementing new rules and 
agreements have stalled or have been hindered due to contrasting interests and as a result of 
deep-rooted historical altercations. 
Why are the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereafter ASEAN) economies integral 
on a global scale, and in what way are they indispensable for the development of both the US 
and Chinese economies? First and foremost, the regions are known to be strategically 
significant, partially due to the transport links that bridge Asia to the Middle East and Europe 
via its narrow waterways. It is further a viable flashpoint from a regional security perspective 
inter alia due to conflicting national ownership claims of the South-China Sea.  Nonetheless, 
despite its fragile setting, South-East Asia possesses a vast history of remaining renitent in the 
face of domination, and it has further intricately manoeuvred her way among the great 
powers of Asia and the West.   
Next, the ASEAN regional bloc is an emerging economic powerhouse. Its GDP exceeds 
US$ 2 trillion (3 percent of world GDP) and is likely to grow at an average rate of 6 percent 
for the forthcoming two decade (World Bank 2015). Furthermore, the bloc can be considered 
as being one of the most prominent outsourcing destinations for a plethora of nations ranging 
from the US and the European Union (EU) to China and Japan.    
Furthermore, economic ties with the rest of emerging Asia have heightened: China’s share of 
the ASEAN trade market has almost tripled from 5 percent in 2001 to 13 percent in 2011, 
while the US and EU share has nearly halved, from 30 percent to 18 percent; exemplifying 
the fact that Chinese influence has greatly intensified in recent years. Also, it is evident that 
manufactured exports now account for three-quarters of ASEAN exports, ranging from low-
wage products in Cambodia and Vietnam to advanced electronics and textiles in Malaysia and 
Thailand and further leading financial service from Indonesia and Singapore. 
These factors have resulted in the ASEAN regions becoming a sought-after partner in terms 
of both regional security and trade initiatives. In relation to the matter of trade, ASEAN has 
completed many Free Trade Agreements (hereafter FTAs) with subsequent Asian partners, 
commencing with a path breaking initiative with China in 2003, and it is now attempting to 
knit these together under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (hereafter 
RCEP) as one of the prominent members, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
(hereafter TPP) as a partial member. Four ASEAN economies joined 12 countries from 
around the Pacific to negotiate the TPP. Both projects have critics: some perceive the RCEP 
as being too slow and too weak to make a difference, while others consider the TPP as being 
greatly intrusive for countries in the early stages of development. 
This paper as a whole examines the notion of the Chinese integration effort within the 
ASEAN region focusing on the comparative analysis of the TPP and the RCEP and its further 
development into the Silk Road project. Furthermore, section 2 illustrates the brief historical 
process for the development of the ASEAN bloc and the manner in which it has burgeoned 
continuously throughout the past years. Next, Section 3 presents the comparative analysis 
between the US-led TPP and the ASEAN-planned RCEP. The final section delineates various 
concluding comments and the limits and recommendations of the Chinese approach on both 
agreements are further exhibited. 
 
2 A historical approach to the East Asian regional integration effort  
Since the Plaza agreement in 1985, the notion of international trade in the East-Asian region 
was upheld by the Japanese and American trade ties. When contrasted to the intra-regional 
trade intensified European Union, which accounts for more than 60 percent of their trade, the 
prominent source of internal trade in the Asian region depends largely on the action of extra-
regional markets, such as those in the EU and the US. Facets alike to technology innovated 
Japanese goods and a populous domestic market in the US resulted in the majority of the 
Asian economies having to rely upon the spill-over impacts in relation to technology from 
Japan, and cheap labour products from the US; thus, the major trade-related countries had no 
need to adhere to any forms of regional integration. 
Table 1 Economic volume of ASEAN economies 
 (Source: China-briefing.com 2015) 
In addition, historical and ethical animus are subsequent problematic issues within the Asian 
region. In comparison to Germany in the early 20th Century, the notion of Japanese imperial 
policy and the impact of World War Two are further sources of chagrin within the Asian 
region. Furthermore, these issues are to this day sources of intense conflict between Japan 
and subsequent nations alike to China and the Koreas. This sort of historical dilemma has 
been a persistent source of struggle during the last century. 
Following the disappointing progress of the Uruguay Round Ministerial meeting in 1990, the 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad offered the formation of a regional trading 
bloc including members of ASEAN and China, Hong Kong, Japan and Korea, which was to 
be known as the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG). The prominent aim was to establish a 
regional trade arrangement for the group in response to the emergence of preferential regional 
trade arrangements elsewhere, such as that in North America. It was blocked from 
progressing further due to the US and Japanese objection of the proposal; and increased 
pressure from the US on her Asian allies to restrain from supporting the deeds of the EAEG. 
Thus, although the project was unable to proceed, it was deemed as being what many 
perceived as a signal of a re-ascendant East Asia; and was further the seed of the ASEAN 
plus 3 project. 
Since the early 1990s, East Asian countries have liberalised their financial systems and have 
further increased the provision of capital accounts. This has further resulted in an influx of 
long and short-term capital investment and have dredged their market-orientated growth 
policy. However, the imminent vulnerabilities of the global financial market stimulated the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, and it exposed the need for an abridged regional paradigm and 
a new wave of regional integration in Asia, which allows it to stand without the aid of 
external Western partners. Furthermore, prior to the financial crisis, the US dominated the 
trading market, and was a lead importer in terms of internal trade with the members of the 
ASEAN. The national wealth of the member nations depleted due to the influence of Western 
financial institutions alike to hedge funds, and as a result, the members of the ASEAN started 
to search for a subsequent nation to enable the level of trade to sustain. The answer they 
found was China. This was greatly aided by the considerable number of Sino-businesses 
within the ASEAN region that enabled the integration process to proceed with greater ease. 
The financial crisis in East Asia signalled for the emerging economies to embark on various 
feats to further the notion of economic regionalism in the areas of international trade and 
global finance. The crisis further stimulated the region’s economies, which were in prior 
years, progressively interdependent toward the US market, to acknowledge the value of the 
regional economic cooperation among themselves and to proceed to institutionalise such 
interdependence.  Since November 2001, the notion of regional economic integration was 
initiated via the free trade agreement between the Chinese and the ASEAN nations, and from 
then on, more than 30 agreements were penned between subsequent members. Throughout 
the course of this period, the majority of the East Asian economies acknowledged the fact that 
unless they were to develop their own method of regional trade, they will undoubtedly be 
disadvantaged in the field of international trade and multilateral agreements. Also, after the 
financial crisis, certain nations alike to Thailand and Indonesia have identified the 
prominence of uniting themselves to reap the benefits of the bargaining power against the EU 
and the US.   
Government technocrats in East Asia, akin to China and Korea were further made greatly 
aware of the need to amass a bigger market on a domestic scale, in order to exploit the scale 
of economics and dynamic efficiency gains. Thus, they perceived that the East Asian regional 
agreement could elevate both productivity and international competitiveness within their 
respective nations. Furthermore, it can make way for trade and investment, promote the 
notion of harmonisation when rule-making, standard-setting and various procedures in order 
to administer an efficient resolution. Thus, this would imminently bolster the calibre of the 
economy in that, the service, labour mobility, investment, competition policy, intellectual 
property rights sectors would be increased in terms of their provision. Therefore, it is evident 
that this effort was essentially fundamental in developing the economy of the nations’ via the 
deepening of trade and investment integration. 
The notion of an ‘East Asian Community,’ was first proposed by the East Asian Vision Group 
in 2001, and sought to improve economic cooperation, financial cooperation, political and 
security cooperation, environmental cooperation, social and cultural cooperation and 
institutional cooperation. This eventually materialised in November 2004, when the East 
Asian Leaders proposed to form the East Asian Community and the idea of holding an East 
Asian Summit was further approved. Regardless of the fact that the prominent objectives 
were fairly expansive, the matter can be summarised within economic cooperation; ranging 
from the establishment of the East Asian Free Trade Areas, expansion of the framework 
agreement on an ASEAN investment area to all of East Asia and promoting the notion of a 
technological and knowledge based economy. Further feats that were introduced ranged from 
various financial cooperation schemes including the finding of a self-aid regional facility for 
financial cooperation to the adoption of a better exchange rate coordination mechanism that 
was in tandem with both financial stability and economic development. 
Amid the financial predicament of 2007 in the US, China was a prominent economy which 
sought to achieve a monumental growth rate of over 10 percent, and Beijing announced a 
pragmatic package for the ASEAN to surmount the global financial crisis. In April 2009, then 
Prime Minister Wen Jiabao originally planned to make a three point proposal at the abortive 
ASEAN summit in Pattaya, Thailand, to embrace the members of the ASEAN. 
Wen proposed three focal points; first, put countering the financial crisis at the top of the East 
Asian cooperation agenda and focus on addressing the most pressing issues facing this 
regions; second, seize the opportunity of the crisis to make cooperation (sic) in all areas more 
substantive and robust and advance regional integration, and third, bear in mind common, 
long-term interests, unswervingly advance East Asian integration and promote regional peace 
and prosperity. (Wang, 2009) 
There was even an direct financial support program to strengthen the relations with the 
ASEAN nations, notably China-ASEAN investment cooperation fund totalling US$10 billion 
was initiated, and sought to provide around US$39.7 million in special assistance to 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar to meet urgent needs, and to offer, over the next five years, an 
extra 2,000 government scholarships and 200 master’s scholarships for public administration 
students from developing countries in ASEAN. (Ibid. 2009) 
The notion of regional trade agreements have smeared the East Asian countries development 
in that the multilateral trade system, which was the by-product of US administration, has 
resulted in the increase in the division between the rich and the poor. International regulatory 
schemes akin to those initiated by the WTO, have encountered difficulty in removing 
international trade barriers and have instead had a more detrimental impact on the nations’ 
economies’. Furthermore, there have been brewing credential issues towards the ASEAN 
regions from the US-planned financial scheme which was implemented by the World Bank 
and IMF. 
Embracing similar goals of trade liberalization and economic integration, the TPP and RCEP 
are two schemes of regional economic integration that have gained widespread attention in 
the Asia Pacific region since 2010. It is somewhat outlandish that the China-supported RCEP 
does not include the US while the US-led TPP does not involve China at present, and what is 
more, the intrinsic notion of the latter scheme, will undoubtedly impede the Chinese 
administration from joining due to the hefty costs that a membership would bring about. 
 
3 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and the missing role in China 
In the latter stages of 2002, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore agreed to form a ‘Common 
Economic Partnership’ which was a forum that prioritised open trade, and when Brunei 
joined in subsequent years post the free trade negotiation, it was known as the ‘Trans-Pacific 
Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement.’ It was eventually renamed as the ‘Trans-Pacific 
Partnership,’ (TPP) as more countries proceeded to join. The agreement was both extensive 
and vast, and the ramifications it brought about were further expansive, affecting trades in 
manufacturing, environmental and employment legislations and intellectual property issues. 
In 2009, when the US president Obama formally entered the TPP negotiation, the 
membership at that time included Australia, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam and in 
April 2013 Canada, Japan and Mexico followed through. All applicants were successful in 
obtaining a membership besides South Korea. Although there are solely twelve members in 
the scheme, the combined GDP of the TPP parties stands at US$ 27.7 trillion, comprising 40 
percent of global GDP and one-third of world trade.   
The prime objectives of the TPP is to augment trade and investment among the TPP 
members; promote innovation, economic growth, and development; and to aid in the creation 
and retention of jobs to take the helm and to ‘craft a high-standard, 21st century agreement, 
which was proclaimed by the US Trade Representative. These objectives are set to be 
achieved via the construction of a free and open business environment through the 
establishment of a comprehensive, next generation regional agreement and liberalising trade 
and investment. Furthermore, it is vital that the traditional trade issues and subsequent 
twenty-first century challenges are embraced. 
 
3-1 TPP from the US perspective 
The main yardstick with which Washington measures Asian initiatives is how they affect its 
ability to be the dominant power in the region. The thrust of US foreign policy, in the words 
of the former US Secretary of State, James Baker, is always to avoid any institutional device 
that ‘would draw a line down the middle of the Pacific and threaten to divide East Asia and 
North America.; (Bergstern, 1997). In relation to the US regional policy, there are two major 
pillars in terms of economic and diplomatic progress. The Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) enables the US to economically and politically integrate the 
European Union, and the TPP scheme further serves as the gateway for the US to merge their 
value and ethics with the Pacific Rim countries. After more than a decade of minimal focus 
on the APEC, and with the Doha Round being discussed without much avail; due to the 
preference for bilateral trade agreements, the U.S. government has now embraced the TPP 
negotiations in its place.   
It is apparent that the Anglo-American financial crisis has mercilessly unveiled the perils of 
US’s dependence on the international trade and the gravity of the problem in being burdened 
with large trade and financial deficits and debts. Since the considerable trade deficit is the 
primary drive for America to resort to its debt-financed economy, increasing exports to 
reverse the trend and to reduce the trade deficit has become the key issue and objective in the 
Obama government’s economic recovery plan. On his 2010 State of Union address, Obama 
addressed to renew and revitalise efforts to promote American export. He promised “to boost 
American exports, support American jobs, and level the playing field in the growing markets 
of Asia, we intend to complete negotiations on a TPP. And tonight, I am announcing that we 
will launch talks on a comprehensive Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership with the 
EU, because trade that is fair and free across the Atlantic supports millions of good-paying 
American jobs.” (Union address 12 Feb. 2013) The agreement expected a double in the 
quantity of exports and it further forecasted the creation of 2 million employment 
opportunities by the year 2015. It was at almost the same time that the TPP talks started to 
unravel. The President’s 2012 Trade Policy Agenda issues by the US Trade Representative 
pointed out that TPP is primarily engineered to create new opportunities for trade and 
cooperation in the Asian Pacific region, in order to elevate the US economy and to stimulate 
employment. It is thus evident that it would have undoubtedly caused a fracas due to 
conflicting Chinese interests in the same regions. 
The TPP is further regarded as an provisional arrangement or stepping stone towards a 
broader, all-encompassing Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (hereafter FTAAP), that is 
viable within the forthcoming decade, as conceived by the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (hereafter APEC) leaders in Bogor in November 1994 and advocated more 
recently by them in their meeting in Honolulu in November 2011. The TPP negotiations are 
not only contemplating the inclusion of further nations but are also preparing and 
constructing the trade protocol with an aim for further extensive collaborations with 
subsequent APEC members, including China. 
From Washington’s perspective, her economic policy has always been in tandem with the 
regional strategic policy. Thus, it is apparent that the TPP served as a viable route to bridge 
her economic relations with the ASEAN regions via the implementation of a newly 
reenergized strategic approach to East Asia. The 2007 crisis which sent a ripple through the 
Western financial world, however, was instrumental in disengaging the trade barriers and 
obstacles that impeded investment and was thus, greatly influential in enabling the US to 
ascend in the hierarchy of foreign policy via increased regional engagement with the East 
Asian nations. 
Furthermore, the notion of the TPP synthesises with the idea of combatting heightening 
Chinese influence in the East Asian region. In a world of propagating FTAs, the US 
government is powerless to hinder East Asian governments from establishing agreements 
among themselves, and thus, the creation of a subsequent trade group that includes the US 
serves as a beacon of US influence in contesting increasing Chinese prestige in these regions. 
Next, regardless of the unceasing administration protestations, it is evident that the TPP 
serves as an efficient pressure point on China. The entry of the US into the TPP negotiations 
occurred in tandem with a period of erratic relations with the Chinese government, due to the 
elevating nationalistic and intrusive nature of Chinese domestic and foreign policies. 
In addition, the fact that the TPP consists of an array of participants in the Asia-Pacific region 
serves as a great advantage. It is the common consensus among Economists, that the regional 
free trade areas are a more feasible route to reaping benefits that outweigh the trade diversion 
liability of this approach. However, the fact that the TPP allows a regional approach that 
averts from the problems encountered by the APEC in the late 1990s is more prevalent. The 
APEC provided the Obama administration with a scene at which they could push for the 
ideologies presented by the TPP, but the negotiations themselves were not an initial APEC 
objective. 
En masse, the TPP is a reflection of the US pledge to markets with a sparse role for 
government in their economy. This American perception on the suitable role of a government 
in the market is also reflected in the ruminations of the WTO. The TPP, however, departs 
from the WTO commitment and instead adheres to the notion of multilateralism. The ongoing 
FTA negotiations between the US and the EU is a subsequent exemplar of this trend in 
steering away from multilateralism. This exodus from multilateralism in international trade is 
an antiphon to the rise of China and the realisation that for the first time since the end of 
World War Two, another nation possesses the economic capacity to exercise leadership in 
Asia, with conflicting views from the Western norm on how economies should burgeon. 
Despite Washington’s calls of affection, the mainstream US media have nevertheless 
continued to portray the TPP as being a ballast to impede the rise of China. According to 
Forbes, ‘American trade policy is trying to contain China, notably through the mega-regional 
TPP, from which China is excluded’. Another report from the Wall Street Journal, ‘In the run-
up to the APEC summit, people familiar with the matter say, the US blocked China’s effort to 
begin negotiations on a regional free-trade agreement. The Free Trade Area of the Asia 
Pacific, because it conflicted with a Washington-backed alternative known as the Trans-
Pacific Partnership that excludes China.’ 
 
3-2 Japan and the TPP 
In July 2013, Japan joined the TPP negotiations in July 2013 despite fervent opposition from 
the domestic agricultural lobbies in contrast to strong support from the corporations. In 
tandem with the concept of ‘Abenomics’ the TPP will strive to achieve economic prosperity 
post two decades of the ‘missing’ period and to restore sustained growth. Without growth, 
Japan will be powerless to solve the prominent areas of concern, alike to the matter of 
securing and increasing the provision of employment, sustaining a dependable social security 
system in an aging society, and reducing public debt to a level that is maintainable. 
During his speech to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies on the 22nd Feb. 2013, 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated that “Firstly, when the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific 
region becomes more and more prosperous, Japan must remain a leading promoter of rules. 
By rule, I mean those for trade, investment, intellectual property, labour, environment and the 
like. Secondly, Japan must continue to be a guardian of the global commons, like the 
maritime commons, open enough to benefit everyone. Japan’s aspirations being such. Thirdly, 
Japan must work even more closely with the US, Korea Australia and other like-minded 
democracies throughout the region”. (CSIS speech 2013) 
The crux of Abenomics in line with the TPP agreement can boost foreign investment in 
Japan, which would in-turn increase Japanese manufacturers’ access to goods and services in 
the markets of member countries with whom Japan had no prior economic relations with, 
alike to the US. This would further stimulate the confidence rates for Japanese MNEs 
investing in subsequent member countries through egalitarian treatment of foreign investment 
and intricate intellectual property rights protection in the host countries. It would further be 
greatly beneficial for small and medium size firms to conduct business through simpler trade 
procedures. In addition, the TPP would undoubtedly intensify Japan-US political 
relationships and make way for the diversification of Japanese trade, given the fear of 
overdependence on China and the perceived risk that increased relations with China entails. 
Next, China has been playing an effective advocating role. Beijing has further exercised self-
restraint over the East China Sea dispute (including the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands) with Japan, 
and the fracas that arose over territories in the South China Sea with several Southeast Asian 
regions were dealt with ease. Abe’s repeated visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine where 
some 2.5 million souls’ of Japan’s war dead are honoured as patriotic heroes, catalysed the 
strained diplomatic relations with subsequent Asian nations alike to China and South-Korea. 
This was due to the fact that many of those souls’ perturbed both Korean and Chinese citizens 
alike and thus, Abe’s act of respect, merely stimulates aggravation. Furthermore, the fact that 
14 Class-A war criminals convicted at the Tokyo tribunal, including war leader Tojo Hidiki, 
are enshrined at Yasukuni, further serves as a source of strife between the two nations. 
However, in recent years, Beijing and Tokyo have averted their perceptions to focus on the 
future rather than dwell on the past. The notion of being ‘hot economically, cool politically’ 
was penned to aid this cause. Nonetheless, Abe’s continuous comments of respect and erratic 
behaviour on this matter greatly impedes any forms of bilateral trade agreement and instead, 
strains the relations further. 
Geopolitically Japan is considered to be an Asian powerhouse, and that fact is unalterable. 
However, it is apparent that Japan’s partners and competitors have long been in the West, and 
that fact remained constant post World War 2. Moreover, having burgeoned under US tutelage 
and protection, post-war Japanese identity became disparate, and progressively reliant upon 
the West. Furthermore, post the Cold War, the fact that Japan was the gateway to increased 
US influence in the East was acknowledged by China and Korea, and thus, this deteriorated 
relations significantly in terms of trade. Thus, when Abe, a staunch supporter of Japan-US 
relations, was re-elected in 2012, this galvanised the friction between Japan and her 
neighbouring nations. 
 
3-3 China in the TPP as an observer 
Akin to Turkey and the EU membership, China was not greeted favourably. In Beijing’s view 
of the TPP, joining the existing TPP with minimal opportunity for discussion on any of the 
existing provisions bestowed a multitude of predicaments at the domestic level. In May 2013, 
a spokesman for the Ministry of Commerce, Shen Danyang briefed that China will ‘analyse 
the pros and cons of joining the TPP, based on careful research and according to the 
principles of equality and mutual benefit. We also hope to exchange information and 
materials with TPP members on the negotiations’ (Reuters, 30 May 2013). 
Despite frequent public announcements by the US leaders that the Washington welcomes a 
prosperous and strong China, Chinese technocrats possess an intrinsic suspicion of the real 
intentions of the US. They are persistently vigilant of the possibility of a US-led coalition to 
deter China’s continuous expansion in terms of her prestige and economic prowess. Chinese 
leaders further perceive that America always possesses the intention to politically 
‘Westernise’ the mainland by prying on her domestic affairs and ‘severing’ the country by 
thwarting the reunification of Taiwan and meddling in Tibetan affairs. 
In an article published in the People’s Daily, the official newspaper of the Communist Party 
of China, it states that ‘the US does not want to be squeezed out of the Asia-Pacific region by 
China … (the) TPP is superficially an economic agreement but contains an obvious political 
purpose to constrain China’s rise.(Ding, 2011) In addition, Song Guoyou, Shanghai Fudan 
University notes that the current TPP member countries in negotiations are mainly military 
allies of the US, which demonstrates the fact that the US has followed its traditional pattern 
of choosing FTA partners – offering priorities to its military allies, and conclude the US 
collaboration with its military allies in East Asia will be strengthened through a closer trade 
relationship.’ (Song, 2011) 
On a domestic scale, there are two prominent matters of consideration when adhering to the 
high-standard of the TPP. China could however, benefit from liberalisation in the 
manufacturing sectors, a high-standard of protection and the promotion of investment, even 
from more rigorous anti-corruption rules, these issues are in tandem with the reform agenda 
of Xi’s regime. As a result, Beijing became concerned with the possible economic adversities 
that were to arise due to rapid domestic alterations imposed by the new TPP regulation in 
domestic markets. Moreover, the high standards of the TPP may not be beneficial for Chinese 
standards, on matters alike to intellectual property rights. 
From the Chinese perspective, the TPP, derived from the US is a gateway to obtaining 
indirect long-term economic and strategic benefits, including aiding small-medium sized 
American firms to exploit the free trade agreement environment, and ensuring that 
Washington’s role as the rule-maker in regional trade regulations is sustained. Furthermore, 
the TPP was regarded as the US-dominated unified free trade association that benefits US 
firms rather than acting for the members’ welfare. Li and Whalley (2013) assesses the 
impacts of China being in or out of the TPP negotiations, via the use of a conventional static 
model with the two embellishments of trade costs in tariff form but with real resource use 
rather than revenue generation and endogenous trade imbalances. The report demonstrates 
that China loses in being astray from the TPP, but gains if inside a trade cost targeted 
negotiation. Based on 2011 data, the effects are small (1-2% GDP) and are much smaller and 
even negative for China in terms of their tariffs alone. 
Beneath his shroud of suspicion, the US-led TPP is regarded as isolating Asia, as not all Asian 
members are entitled to a membership. In principle, the TPP is open to all ASEAN members 
who are willing and able to strive for a higher standard of rule, and the US strategy from the 
dawn, was to commence negotiations with a minor association of economies with similar 
objectives to that of her own. As a result, it was met with a barrage of criticisms. For instance, 
it was met with great distaste by the Cambodian prime minister Hun Sen at the 24th World 
Economic Forum on East Asia in Jakarta, “We should review it again … why did the TPP not 
include ten ASEAN members? … What is the purpose, real intention of establishing (the) 
TPP... that they include half of ASEAN to be partners... and leaving the other half of ASEAN 
outside”. (The Diplomat April 2015) 
According to Li, Wang and Whalley, ‘China’s strategy has been one of remaining flexible, in 
part, targeting each regional trade agreement to the preferences of China’s partner. There is 
no “one size fits all” approach to regional trade agreements as has been the case more so with 
the EU and the US’ (Li, 2014). 
 
4 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and Chinese dominance 
 
4-1 The meaning of RCEP 
In the midst of the WTO’s declining credibility as a result of its inefficient ability to 
negotiate, the ASEAN and China led mega-regional trade deal, the RCEP due to be penned. 
The RCEP could create the world’s largest economic trading bloc and could further bring 
about a multitude of ramifications for the world economy. 
The prime objective of the RCEP is to attain a modern, comprehensive, high-quality, and 
mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement among the ASEAN member states and 
ASEAN’s free trade agreement partners. This would permit every nation in the agreement to 
contribute to sustain the economy of each country and to further strive for economic 
integration, equitable economic development, and strengthening economic cooperation 
among the participants. 
It is the common consensus in China that the RCEP is a viable route for the promotion of the 
East Asian cooperation in a sui generis manner, via the combination of the 10 ASEAN 
members and their cohesive integration with their six major trading partners. (Australia, 
China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea). RCEP serves as the basis for the world’s 
largest free trade bloc with 3.5 billion individuals alongside three major proponents of global 
market growth; China, India and the ASEAN. According to Basu Das (2013), RCEP will 
adhere to the rules and norms mostly attuned to ASEAN conventions and guidelines, built on 
a consensus. Flexible trade negotiation standards will make the RCEP attractive, and would 
bring closer affinity at the institutional level connectivity and push further the much-needed 
people-to-people contacts at the regional level. 
Table 2 Key features of the TPP and RCEP agreement (August 2014) 
 TPP RCEP 
First mooted December 2009 November 2011 
Official negotiations March 2010 May 2013 
Intended completion Late 2014 Late 2015 
Negotiating rounds completed Nineteen Five  
Primary goal Address quality issues through a 
new “twenty-first-century” free 
trade agreement 
ASEAN-plus-X model, accession 
yet to occur 
Relation to regional architecture Not tied to any existing 
organisation 
Affirms principle of ASEAN 
Centrality 
Scope and coverage “WTO Plus” aspirations – 20 non-
tariff issues targeted  
“WTO consistent” only – mostly 
focussed on tariffs 
Majour sponsor US-led ASEAN-led  
Current members Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, US and 
Vietnam 
ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, 
China, India, Australia and New 
Zealand 
Significant “absent” members China, Indonesia and Korea US 
(Source: Wilson J. D. 2015) 
As detailed by the figures above, it is evident that China and India, two of the prominent 
drivers of Asian economic growth, are absent from the TPP negotiations, while the US, a 
subsequent powerhouse across the Pacific Ocean, is missing from the RCEP. As such, various 
government officials, technocrats and scholars from both nations (China and the US) perceive 
that the TPP and the RCEP are conflicting in terms of their principles. This is as, it is apparent 
that China and India are aiming to establish a regional framework that ostracises the US, 
while the US is adamant on establishing a regional bloc without the presence of China. 
Table 3, exemplifies the fact that the RCEP countries are superior in terms of their population 
count at 3.4 billion than the TPP economies, which constitutes for 0.8 billion of the global 
population. Nonetheless, the TPP members possess the higher GDP and PPP rates on average 
than their RCEP counterparts. All in all, the RCEP nations account for 48.3 percent of world 
population, 29.2 percent of world GDP and 28.3 percent of world trade, in comparison to the 
TPP who account for 11.3 percent, 38.8 percent and 25.8 percent, respectively. The data 
stated above coherently illustrates the fact that the TPP and the RCEP are prominent regional 
blocs in the world economy and that their respective coverage in the global economy as a 
whole, is considerable. Furthermore, the data outlines the fact that the average GDP per 
capita is significantly larger for the TPP nations (US$32,751) when compared to the RCEP 
countries (US$18,879), echoing the fact that low-income with the sino-ethnics diaspora 
countries primarily make up the RCEP. 
 
Table 3 economic indicators of the TPP and RCEP members 
 Populati
on 
 PPP GDP  GDP per 
capita 
(US$) 
GDP 
growth 
(annual %) 
Trade 
 
 
 million % US$ US$ billi
on 
%   US$ billi
on 
% 
China 1,350.7 19.2 10,920 8,227.1 11.4 6,091.0 7.7 3,866.9 10.4 
South Korea  50.0 0.7 32,350 1,129.6 1.6 22,590.2 2.3 1,067.5 2.9 
India 1,236.7 17.6 5,000 1,841.7 2.5 1,489.2 5.1 782.6 2.1 
Cambodia 14.9 0.2 2,710 14.0 0.0 944.4 7.3 19.2 0.1 
Indonesia 246.9 3.5 8,750 878.0 1.2 3,556.8 6.3 378.4 1.0 
Lao 6.6 0.1 4,170 9.4 0.0 1,417.1 8.0 5.1 0.0 
Myanmar 52.8 0.7 n/a 52.5 0.1 861.0 n/a 20.4 0.1 
Philippines 96.7 1.4 7,310 250.2 0.3 2,587.0 6.8 117.4 0.3 
Thailand 66.8 0.9 13,430 366.0 0.5 5,479.8 7.7 477.1 1.3 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
0.4 0.0 n/a 17.0 0.0 41,126.6 0.9 17.0 0.0 
Malaysia 29.2 0.4 21,460 305.0 0.4 10,432.1 5.6 424.0 1.1 
Singapore 5.3 0.1 74,150 274.7 0.4 51,709.5 2.5 788.1 2.1 
Vietnam 88.8 1.3 4,800 155.8 0.2 1,755.2 5.2 228.4 0.6 
Japan 127.6 1.8 11,400 5,959.7 8.2 46,720.4 1.8 1,684.4 4.6 
Australia 22.7 0.3 41,700 1,532.4 2.1 67,555.8 3.7 517.8 1.4 
New Zealand 4.4 0.1 30,970 167.3 0.2 37,749.4 2.5 75.6 0.2 
US 313.9 4.5 52,220 16,244.6 22.4 51,748.6 2.3 3,882.7 10.5 
Canada  34.9 0.5 41,270 1,821.4 2.5 52,219.0 1.7 929.7 2.5 
Mexico 120.8 1.7 16,030 1,178.1 1.6 9,748.9 4.0 751.4 2.0 
Chile 17.5 0.2 20,270 269.9 0.4 15,452.2 5.4 158.1 0.4 
Peru 30.0 0.4 10,390 203.8 0.3 6,795.8 6.0 88.2 0.2 
RCEP 3,400.5 48.3 17,941 21,180.6 29.2 18,879.1 4.9 10,469.6 28.3 
TPP 795.5 11.3 29,515 28,129.8 38.8 32,751.1 3.5 9,545.2 25.8 
World 7,046.4 100 13,878 72,440.4 100.0 10,280.5  37,006.6 100 
(Source: databank.worldbank.org 2015) 
The TPP, in particular, would reap a great deal of benefits for the ASEAN as a whole, 
especially if it were bolstered from the current four negotiators (Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore 
and Vietnam) to include Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. ASEAN’s total acquisitions 
are perceived as being three times as great with the TPP, due to the presence of Western 
powerhouses alike to America whereas under the RCEP, the majority of the nations, aside 
from China; are relatively mediocre in terms of their economic prowess. Furthermore, the 
TPP is perceived as being the gateway for a more profound integration and preferential 
access to greater new markets, while the RCEP overlaps in terms of its principles, as it is 
merely a network of FTAs between the ASEAN and its subsequent members. 
The ASEAN policymakers should dismiss the belief that they must choose between the TPP 
and the RCEP, since both policies have proven to have their own merits. Moreover, it is 
apparent however, that these perks are complementary. This can be deduced from the fact 
that, the TPP predominantly focuses on greater synthesis with America, whereas the RCEP 
concentrates on continuing integration across the Asian markets, with China as the nucleus. 
The benefits of implementing and utilising both agreements simultaneously amount to 
approximately 90 percent of the sum of the benefits derived from implementing each 
agreement alone; in other words, the agreements beget distinctive, interdependent gains. At 
the same time however, nations who are members of both initiatives must ensure that they do 
not burgeon into alternate competing blocs. 
 
Table 4 Comparison of TPP and RCEP objectives 
 TPP RCEP 
Market access 
for goods 
• Eliminating of tariff barriers with 
significant WTO + commitments 
• Progressive elimination of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers on 
• Elimination of non-tariff barriers 
• Negotiated market access and trade 
facilitation for textiles and apparel 
substantially all trade in goods 
• Comprehensive and high level 
of tariff liberalisation 
Trade 
facilitation 
• Predictable, transparent and 
expeditious customs procedures 
• Strong and common rules of origin 
• Build on WTO commitments on 
sanitary and phytosanitory measures 
and technical barriers to trade 
• Facilitate regional value chains 
• Facilitate trade and investment 
• Enhance transparency in trade 
and investment 
• Facilitate regional and global 
value chains 
Service • Fair, open and transparent markets for 
service across borders, while 
preserving right to regulate 
• Open trade and investment in 
financial services, e-commerce and 
telecommunications 
• Negotiate on a negative list basis 
• Transparency and efficiency in 
temporary entry 
• Substantially eliminate 
restrictions and discriminatory 
measures on trade in services 
• Build on commitments made by 
RCEP members under WTO and 
ASEAN+1 free trade 
agreements 
• Negotiate on all sectors and 
modes of supply 
Investment • Liberal access for investment and 
legal protection for investors 
• Expeditious, fair and transparent 
investor-state dispute settlement 
• Liberal, facilitative, competitive 
investment regime 
• Negotiate on promotion, 
protection, facilitation and 
liberalisation 
Competition • Promote competitive business 
environment, protect consumers, 
ensure level playing field 
• Establishment and maintenance of 
competition laws and authorities, 
fairness, transparency, consumer 
protection, private rights 
• Promote competition, economic 
efficiency, consumer welfare, 
curtailing anti-competitive 
practices 
• Recognise differences in 
capacity in RCEP on 
competition policy 
Intellectual 
property 
• Ensure effective and balanced 
intellectual property rights 
• Reinforce and extend WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) 
• Cover trademarks, geographical 
indications, copyrights, patents, trade 
secrets, data exclusivity 
• Cover intellectual property 
enforcement, genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge 
• Reduce intellectual property 
related barriers to trade and 
investment 
• Promote cooperation in 
utilization, protection and 
enforcement of intellectual 
property rights 
Dispute 
resolution 
• Clear and effective rules for resolving 
disputes 
• Effective, efficient and 
transparent process for 
consultation and dispute 
resolution 
Cooperation • Focus on needs of developing 
member economies in implementing 
high-standard provisions 
• Establishing institutional mechanism 
for cooperation and capacity building 
• Build on cooperation agreement 
between ASEAN and dialogue 
partners 
• Focus on development gaps in 
RCEP and maximise the mutual 
benefits 
Accession  • ASEAN free trade agreement 
partners may join negotiations 
as agreed by negotiating 
members 
• Accession clause to enable other 
ASEAN free trade agreement 
partners to join RCEP later 
Environment • Address trade and environment 
challenges 
• Discuss marine fisheries, 
conservation, biodiversity, invasive 
species, climate change, 
environmental goods and services 
 
Government 
procurement 
• Ensure fair, transparent, non-
discriminatory government 
procurement 
• Comparable coverage by all 
economies; transitional arrangements 
for developing economies 
 
Labour • Address labour rights protection and 
ensure cooperation, coordination and 
dialogue 
 
 
(Source: US Trade Representative (2011) for TPP and ASEAN (2012) for RCEP and re-quoted from Petri & 
Abdul-Raheem, 2014) 
4-2 Implications of the TPP and the RCEP 
 
In essence, the TPP is a US-led scheme and is widely regarded as being a ‘WTO-plus 
approach,’ that yearns for cohesive economic integration and trade liberalisation to stimulate 
economic activity on a global scale. However, since the TPP scheme comprises of members 
from different echelons of economic development, it will be an arduous procedure in 
attempting to reach a common consensus on the optimum way forward. This is because of 
contrasting labour laws due to the difference in economic standards, which hinder unified and 
synchronised labour laws from being implemented. Also, intellectual property regulations 
may not strike the right balance between owners of the IP and the users.   
The RCEP’s history however, is somewhat more varied than that of the TPP. It is considered 
to be a regional effort rather than a negotiation among ‘like-minded’ countries, and it is the 
by-product of nearly a decade of numerous attempts to initiate analogous discussions on the 
matter. Besides that, the RCEP synthesises with the ASEAN-Plus-One agreements between 
ASEAN and all the RCEP partners, and these have presumably already tested the curbs of 
regional liberalisation. Thus, it is apparent that the RCEP has a handful of prominent hurdles 
to surpass in order to elevate the status quo. 
Nonetheless, the protocol for the RCEP adopted by ASEAN (2012) are somewhat audacious 
and envisage a modern, comprehensive agreement, covering many of the areas addressed by 
the TPP. However, the guidelines also take into consideration that “the RCEP will include 
appropriate forms of flexibility including provision for special and differential treatment” 
(ASEAN 2012). Furthermore, multiple observers laud this commitment, but it is evident that 
it will be somewhat strenuous to transcend beyond existing agreements, due to the disparate 
nature of their economies. So far, negotiators have impeded the implementation of special 
and differential treatment in the TPP. 
In addition, one of the most focal areas of concern for the RCEP is to attain impartial 
economic development through the sino-ethnics oriented economic cooperation, notably 
within nations akin to Cambodia, Lao and Myanmar. In comparison to the RCEP however, 
the TPP does not put a great deal of weight on the matter of economic cooperation. The 
members of the RCEP are closely knit to China economically as well as ethnically. They are 
all partners or plausible partners of China in its pursuit of the free trade agreements. Thus, the 
RCEP can be regarded being an idyllic podium for China to acknowledge its free trade 
aspirations, and to push for regional economic integration and a tranquil development 
together with subsequent regional players. 
 
4-3 Why Not Both? 
 
The TPP and the RCEP are often regarded as being substitutes, but that is far from the case. 
Numerous ASEAN economies already participate in both negotiations—Brunei, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and Vietnam—and one can acknowledge that there is no rationale to state that 
other middle-income countries should not do so as well. Regardless of the fact that certain 
ASEAN countries cannot liaise with the current phase of negotiations, the agreement is likely 
to anticipate enlargement and set the scene for accession. For countries who are inclined to 
adhere to both agreements; the idea of dual membership is compelling due to each scheme’s 
merits. 
However, the TPP and the RCEP offer benefits that are predominantly interdependent—one 
focuses on profound integration with the Americas, and the other on improved access to 
ASEAN markets, to stimulate increased economic activity. Coinciding memberships further 
aid to ensure that the two initiatives do not proliferate into competing regional blocs; which is 
the infamous drawback of regional FTAs. Countries involved in dual negotiations are most 
likely to align their provisions in order to simplify their internal policy adjustments, and to 
synthesise with the requirements of both schemes. The similarity of the RCEP protocol and 
its TPP counterpart have been acknowledged already. This will not always be the case, but 
nonetheless, a significant overlap will make it more convenient to consolidate the agreements 
in the future, or to proceed from shared provisions into subsequent global negotiations in 
future years. 
The ultimatum for new members is the fact that the TPP template is likely to be more 
stringent and onerous than its RCEP counterpart, and will, in part, mirror the interests of 
countries that are more advanced economically as well as politically (Petri and Plummer 
2012). It is perceived that it will include greatly pressing provisions on services, intellectual 
property, and competition policy, as well as permitting a fewer number of exceptions for 
sensitive sectors. Joining the TPP will require earlier and more difficult reforms than 
participation in the RCEP. At the same time, the benefits under the TPP template are 
predicted to be around twice as grand as those under the RCEP, on the basis that they are 
applied to the same group of countries. Moreover, the necessary reformations with the 
ASEAN nations would in many cases emulate those required for the effective implementation 
of the AEC. 
Furthermore, the fundamental difference is the fact that the TPP puts greater emphasis on a 
single and comprehensive form, whereas the RCEP pushes for a progressive and sequential 
approach, where different components are mediated and implemented under a different time 
table.    
 
5 Conclusion  
With the Obama administration at the helm, America has been readjusting her political and 
economic stance towards the Asia-Pacific, and in doing so, has exercised her power in 
curbing the rise of China in the East. Since Washington has taken the lead in advocating for 
the TPP, it has ceaselessly advocated for standards that Beijing cannot realistically adhere to 
in the near future, and have thus, effectively pursued a policy of isolationism on the Chinese. 
Wen emphasized that “the main reason behind the Obama Administration’s support for the 
TPP agenda is the US’s desire to use the TPP as a tool to economically contain China’s rise. 
… The TPP as superficially an economic agreement but contain an obvious political purpose 
to constrain China’s rise.” (Wen 2012) However, it is evident that this policy of isolationism 
has given way to the rise of the RCEP, a China-centred scheme that has efficaciously 
suppressed the American-led TPP scheme. 
Furthermore, the fact that the majority of the middle class are Chinese ethnics in these 
regions have proven to be fundamental in bridging China’s relations with her Asian 
counterparts. Thus, the contribution of the sino-ethnics has been integral in forming relations 
in trade and politics with these regions; which has resulted in the China centred RCEP 
prevailing over her Western counterpart. 
According to Fitriani in the Jakarta Post (13 August 2010) said “History teaches us that the 
reasons behind the absence of solid Asian regionalism and identity derive not only from 
domestic problems and inter-state distrust among Asian countries, but also from the presence 
of external powers like the US in the region.” In this way, one can acknowledge that 
regardless of the continuous endeavours of the Western world to permeate the Eastern region 
with their economic and political prestige; as displayed in America’s pursuit of the TPP 
scheme, they are powerless to curb the influence of Eastern powerhouses who serve as the 
irrefutable nucleus of Asian development. 
Under the current circumstances, China is voraciously engaging in sub-regional cooperation 
processes with many of her neighbours, ranging from the Greater Mekong Sub-region 
Economic Cooperation to the implementation of China-led economic cooperation zones with 
the relevant ASEAN members. Further schemes such as the Maritime Silk Road initiative and 
the financial connected Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, have reignited the engine of 
regional growth which has ousted her American competitors, in terms of social, cultural and 
political integration. 
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